This study assesses the relationship between political partisanship and attitudes and behavior with respect to the Swine Flu crisis of 2009 in general, and the U.S. mass vaccination program in particular. I argue that even seemingly non-partisan political issues like public health are increasingly characterized by partisan polarization in public attitudes, and that such polarization is in part attributable, at least in part, to the breakdown of the information commons that characterized the American mass media from roughly the 1950s until the early 1990s. In its place has arisen an increasingly fragmented and niche-oriented media marketplace in which individuals are better able to limit their information exposure to attitudes and opinions that reinforce, rather than challenge, their preexisting beliefs. I test my argument against a variety of data sources, including opinion surveys and state level Swine Flu vaccination rate data.
you are now telling me I must…I don't want to take your vaccine. I don't get flu shots. He added if "you have some idiot government official demanding, telling me I must take this vaccine, I'll never take it."
Taking a different tack, two Republican House Members -both doctors -raised objections to the pandemic funding included in a defense supplemental bill. Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA) commented, "We can't let all of our spending and our reaction be media-driven in responding to a panic so that we don't get Katrina-ed. ... It's important because what we are talking about as we discuss the appropriateness of spending $2 billion to produce a vaccine that may never be used -that is a very important decision that our country has to make." Rep. Paul
Broun (R-GA) added, "I don't think we need to spend $1.5 billion on flu vaccine when ... the research shows that it's not going to be very virulent. ... We are stealing our grandchildren's future by borrowing and spending. ... This hysteria over the flu is driving the media, and it's 1 Estimates of Limbaugh's audience magnitude vary from 2 to 50 million listeners per week (Boehlert 2009 Perhaps not surprisingly, given the skepticism voiced by prominent politicians and commentators, combined with pre-existing skepticism about vaccination and immunization programs in general, many Americans -roughly half according to an October 2009 Pew Center survey -indicated that they did not plan to seek the H1N1 vaccine. Such figures worried public health officials who feared that the H1N1 virus could unleash a potentially devastating pandemic.
A somewhat less well-known, but potentially even more troubling, pattern emerged in the same survey: Democrats were nearly 50% more likely than Republicans (60 vs. 41%) to indicate that they would take the vaccine (Schlesinger 2009 ).
What accounts for this stark partisan gap over a seemingly non-partisan topic? And does it hold potentially broader public health implications? In assessing the first question, the most obvious proximate explanation is that Republican partisans were merely responding to trusted (i.e., conservative and Republican) opinion leaders, who voiced greater skepticism of the vaccine (and of the seriousness of the threat in general) than their Democratic counterparts, as the opening anecdotes suggest.
This, of course, begs the question of why Republican elites would be more skeptical than Democratic elites. Several potential explanations immediately come to mind. First, Republicans tend to be more skeptical than Democrats of proactive government intervention in public life.
The Obama Administration's push to promote near universal H1N1 vaccinations constituted a major government intervention in the private lives of citizens. Second, the messenger in this case -the Obama Administration -was more credible, all else equal, to Democrats than Republicans, simply by virtue of its partisan affiliation, while for the same reason skeptical Republican elites were more credible to Republican partisans. Third, greater Republican skepticism of international institutions, like the World Health Organization, further weakened the credibility of the pro-vaccination message to Republicans, relative to Democrats, who tend to be more trusting of global institutions (Page and Bouton 2006 , Holsti 2004 , Baum and Nau 2009 ).
Finally, Republicans and Democrats increasingly expose themselves to distinct information streams via the new media. The streams favored by Republicans, such as the Fox News Channel on cable, as well as conservative talk radio and Internet sites, may have been more critical of the swine flu vaccination program --due to the first three explanations noted above --than their liberal analogs preferred by Democrats. Such a pattern could, in turn, shape vaccination patterns in ways that hold profound implications for public policy and public health.
In this paper I assess the relationship between political partisanship and attitudes and behavior with respect to the Swine Flu crisis of 2009 in general, and the U.S. mass vaccination program in particular. I argue that even seemingly non-partisan political issues like public health are increasingly characterized by partisan polarization in public attitudes, and that such polarization is in part attributable to the breakdown of the information commons that characterized the American mass media from roughly the 1950s until the early 1990s. In its place has arisen an increasingly fragmented and niche-oriented media marketplace in which individuals are better able to limit their information exposure to attitudes and opinions that reinforce, rather than challenge, their preexisting beliefs.
I begin, in the next section, by reviewing the changing media landscape over the past several decades. I then relate the patterns to polarization in partisan political attitudes and behavior with respect to the Swine Flu in general, and the vaccination program in particular.
The Changing Media Marketplace
The decline of the traditional news media since the early 1990s is well documented and widely reported (Baum and Kernell 1999 , Hamilton 2003 , Baum 2003 The so-called new media, by which I refer primarily to cable news channels and the Internet, but also to political talk radio, differ in important ways from their traditional media cousins. Most notably, nearly all such outlets self-consciously seek to appeal to relatively narrow, and hence more loyal niches of the public. Rather than seeking to be all things to all people -as the major networks did during their heyday -new media outlets try to provide a product that more closely fits the preferences of a particular subset of the public.
In news and politics, the primary dimension upon which new media outlets have sought to differentiate themselves is ideology. Most notably, in 2010 there are prominent cable news channels aimed primarily at liberals (MSNBC), conservatives (Fox), and moderates (CNN).
Similarly, on the Internet, the political blogosphere is dominated by ideologically narrow websites like Huffingtonpost.com on the left and Michellemalkin.com on the right. Political talk radio, in turn, is dominated by conservative voices like Beck, Hannity and Limbaugh, though there are some liberal niches, such as a program hosted by MSNBC analyst Ed Schultz. As the range of options available to consumers seeking political information has expanded, making available media environments that closely match their personal political preferences, audiences have increasingly availed themselves of the opportunity to self-select into ideologically friendly political news environments. Figure 1 shows the trend, from 2000 to 2008-09 in the partisan make-up of audiences for CNN, Fox, and MSNBC. These data are derived from pooled national surveys conducted by a market research firm (Scarborough), representing over 100,000 interviews for each period included in the graphic Rice 2010, Feltus 2009 ).
Cable News
[ Figure 1 here]
The curves in Figure 1 to discuss political news with family and friends (Baum and Groeling 2008) and, as shown in Figure 2 , 3 more ideologically extreme.
[ Figure 2 here] Not surprisingly, the audiences for such outlets are highly skewed based on party affiliation. For instance, according to an April 2007 Nielsen report (All 2007) 
Political Talk Radio
In one sense, political talk radio is anything but "new." Indeed, the tradition of populist radio dates back to Father Charles Caughlin who, during the Great Depression, railed against everything from Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, to racial and ethnic 4 Along these lines, Baum and Groeling (2009) report evidence that some ideological news blogs cover the "other side" primarily to set the stage for making their own political argument, in effect using "opposition" political blogs as strawmen. It seems likely that at least some politically sophisticated Internet news consumers are similarly motivated when "crossing over" to ideologically hostile news sources. Network, which declared bankruptcy and ceased broadcasting in 2010 ----political talk radio remains largely a medium for conservative populism in the tradition of Father Caughlin.
Back to the Future?
Though in some ways unique, the current period is by no means the first time in
American politics that partisan media have played an important role in public policy debates.
Rather, viewed in a broader context, overwhelmingly nonpartisan journalism, as we saw in roughly the first four decades following World War II, appears to have been an historical anomaly.
To better understand the implications of our increasingly polarized information environment, it is helpful to consider the partisan press of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In that era, citizens who wanted an accurate picture of the political landscape could read multiple newspapers with differing partisan loyalties in order to triangulate on the "truth" (Schudson 1981, Baum and Groeling 2010) . 5 Such a strategy could offset to some extent any potentially harmful effects of partisan-oriented media. Yet the question remains as to whether typical citizens in the contemporary period, faced with far more varied alternatives, are likely to embrace a triangulation approach to news consumption. The present differs from the past in numerous important respects, not least of which is the explosion in the twenty-first century of entertainment mass media and other competitors for scarce public attention.
While it may be the case that politically attentive Americans in the twenty-first century are proportionately similar in number to their counterparts in prior news eras, a far larger portion of the contemporary population enjoys and exercises the franchise than was the case in the nineteenth-century. Moreover, the ability of party organizations to reliably direct the voting of their members has declined with the death of party machines and the waning influence of state party bosses. Consequently, the breadth of consensus necessary to forge a bipartisan accord is far greater in the twenty-first century, and modern communication and polling technology allows nervous politicians to sense precisely when that consensus is eroding. Of course, gaining consent first requires capturing public attention, and even politically attentive citizens are unlikely to be able to attend to all of the competing messages in the modern media environment.
Not only is it possible to consume nearly limitless political news from virtually any ideological perspective, it is also possible to consume equally limitless entertainment media, while rarely if ever encountering politics (Prior 2007) . This raises the opportunity costs for typical consumers of seeking out alternative political perspectives. Survey evidence suggests that substantial portions of the public also appear to lack the motive to do so. Not surprisingly, these same data indicate that as the strength of an individual's political ideology increases, so too does that individual's preference for news that reinforces her pre-existing beliefs (recall Figure As the prior discussion attests, self-selection, a concept dating back to Campbell and colleagues' (1960) theory of minimalism, may well be sharpening partisan polarization, and this phenomenon seems likely to expand in the future. However, there exists a second, perhaps complementary, culprit: ideologically driven credibility assessments. In other words, contemporary citizens possess, arguably to a greater extent than their predecessors, the means to engage in a multipronged dissonance-avoidance strategy. Selective exposure, or avoiding dissonant information altogether, presumably represents the first such prong. However, even when this first defense mechanism fails and individuals are exposed to ideologically hostile news, they increasingly possess the means --by assigning ideological reputations to individual sources and media outlets --to systematically discount it. In other words, consumers appear also to selectively accept or reject information to which they are exposed based on its perceived credibility (Baum and Groeling 2010) . Credibility assessments in turn depend on the perceived ideological leaning of the outlet presenting the information, as well as on the content of the information itself (e.g., its perceived costliness 
Partisan Polarization and the Flu
When news of the H1N1 virus, commonly known as Swine Flu, first hit the U.S. media, Americans across the political spectrum focused intensely on the issue. As shown in Figure 3 , in the first Pew Center News Interest Index survey to include a question on the Swine Fluconducted in late April 2009 --91% of Republicans, 89% of Democrats, and 87% of Independents indicated that they were following the issue "very" or "fairly" closely. These data suggest that at least initially there was no partisan gap in attention to the Swine Flu story.
[ Figure 3 here] Interestingly, these percentages far exceed the roughly 4 and 5% of Republicans and Democrats, respectively, who indicated that they would not get the vaccine because the Swine Flu risk had been exaggerated. These percentages remain nearly constant for Democrats or
Republicans regardless of their level of attention to the issue. This latter justification seems on its face more clearly attributable a general distrust of the government, which, as noted, was far more prevalent among Republicans, presumably due to the presence of a polarizing Democrat in the White House combined with generally lower levels of faith in government among Republicans.
That said, in a May 2009 Gallup poll, the correlations between approval of President
Obama's job performance and expressing an intent to get the H1N1 vaccine when available, on the one hand, and believing the media were exaggerating the danger associated with the Swine Flu, on the other, were only about .10 and -.02, respectively, among Republicans (compared to .01 and -.06, respectively, among Democrats). The correlations among Republicans change only modestly when we limit the sample to self-described conservative Republicans (.09 and .03, respectively). This suggests that while general Republican or conservative distrust of government, or of a Democratic president, almost certainly accounts for part of these differences, it is insufficient to fully account for these patterns.
Why then would those respondents most attentive to the Swine Flu story be most likely to diverge in their opinions about it, with nearly all highly attentive Democrats believing the story was either being covered appropriately or that the media were understating the danger, while nearly 40% of attentive Republicans held the opposing view? Why, in turn, were Republicans less trusting of the government's capacity to deal with the flue epidemic and more likely to worry that the vaccine itself was dangerous, especially if they were paying close attention to the issue, while variations in attentiveness had almost no effect on Democrats? In the next section, I
argue that the explanation lies, at least in part, in the different information streams to which
Republicans and Democrats exposed themselves, and from which they received starkly varying messages -both in terms of quantity and valence -on the Swine Flu in general, and the vaccination program in particular.
News Consumption and Attitudes Toward the Swine Flu
I have been unable to identify any surveys asking respondents in detail their sources of news about the Swine Flu and vaccine. However, several surveys include questions on attitudes regarding H1N1 or the vaccine and general categories of news sources about the flu (e.g., cable, internet, national TV, etc.). These data allow some suggestive, albeit far from definitive, tests of the hypothesis that the different information streams preferred by Democrats and Republicans in the new media help account for the partisan gap in attitudes regarding the pandemic.
The previously mentioned May 2009 Pew Center survey asked respondents how worried they were that they or a family member would be exposed to the flu. Responses ranged from "not worried at all" to "very worried." The survey included the aforementioned question asking about respondents' primary sources of news about the Swine Flu. My hypothesis anticipates greater partisan polarization in worry over the flu among new media consumers than among consumers of traditional news sources, where all viewers are exposed to more similar information stream.
To test this prediction, I divided the media outlets included in the question into two categories, with cable TV, Internet, and radio counted as "new media" and Local TV news, In sharp contrast, no significant gaps emerge among Democrats. This, again, seems likely attributable to the propensity of Democrats to seek out news sources via news media that are relatively sympathetic to the Administration's representation of the Swine Flu pandemic as a major emergency. Moreover, traditional news sources (like network newscasts) are, all else equal, highly likely to highlight the Administration's perspective in a crisis, due to its status as the most authoritative information source, especially early in the crisis, as was the case at time of this survey (Baum and Groeling 2008 & 2010) .
Finally, it is worth noting that among both groups of partisans who rate press coverage positively, relying on new media sources for flu news is associated with higher levels of concern, while among those who rate coverage poorly, reliance on new media sources is associated with lower levels of concern about the flu (though these latter differences are not statistically significant, and hence must be interpreted with caution).
These results suggest that when given the opportunity to self-select into ideologically "friendly" media environments -as is far more likely in the new than in the traditional mediapartisans are likely to diverge fairly starkly in their attitudes toward the pandemic. However, when confronted with a common information stream -as in the traditional news media -they respond by converging in their attitudes, regardless of partisanship. Moreover, the fact that attitudes regarding press coverage of the Swine Flu story appear closely correlated with news source selection, which in turn appears closely related to concern over the flu, with each relationship heavily mediated by party affiliation, represents further suggestive evidence in favor of the Self-segregated Information Stream hypothesis.
Unfortunately, data limitations in this survey make it impossible to rule out the possibility that differences in the internal characteristics -such as ideological extremeness --of new vs.
traditional news viewing Republicans or Democrats may account for these patterns. After all, as I have already shown (recall Figure 3) , strength of ideology is positively associated with preferring news that reinforces one's preexisting beliefs. So it is doubtless the case that stronger partisans are more prone to self-select into ideologically "friendly" information environments than are weaker partisans, which in turn seems likely to steer them toward new media outlets, which tend to be more amenable to such self-selection. That said, it is worth noting that these results do not appear to derive from differences in overall interest in or attention to the flu across new vs.
traditional news consumers. There is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of having followed the Swine Flu story most closely among the six major news items included in the survey for either Democrats or Republicans who reported relying primarily on new vs.
traditional news media sources for flu-related news.
If it is the case that respondents who prefer new media sources for news about the swine flu do so because they are, on average, more partisan or more ideologically extreme -with new media-oriented Republicans being more conservative and new media-oriented Democrats more liberal than their traditional-news-consuming counterparts --then such a preference might also predict similar differences in attention to other news stories, particularly those with clear partisan implications. To test this possibility, I conducted two ttests: one employing two non-overtly partisan news issues issues (the financial problems of the US auto industry and the state of the economy) and one employing two more directly partisan issues (President Obama's first 100 days in office and to Senator Arlen Spector's switch from the Republican to the Democratic Party). For the less-partisan issues, I found, as expected, comparably small and insignificant differences for both parties. That is, preferring new over traditional media sources for news about the swine flu does not predict differences in attention to the financial woes of the American auto industry or the economy, regardless of party.
For the more overtly partisan issues, Republican new media consumers reported having followed the stories 6% more closely (2.76 vs. 2.60 on the 1-4 scale), on average, than their traditional-news-viewing counterparts. This gap, though nearly significant, is substantively quite small. This, in combination with the fact that virtually no gap at all emerged among Democrats, suggests that a preference for new media sources for swine flu news -here employed as a possible indicator of ex ante strength of partisanship or ideology -does not appear clearly associated with the decision to consume new vs. traditional news media.
Somewhat more direct evidence in this regard is available from a May/June 2009 Pew Global Values Survey, which included several questions with clear ideological implications, along with questions about the Swine Flu and news sources. In this instance, the survey asked whether respondents primary source of national or international news was television, radio, Internet, newspapers or magazines. Because television is not divided into cable vs. broadcast, while the "radio" category is obviously not necessarily limited to political talk radio, the status of these outlets as new vs. traditional media is ambiguous. However, I find substantively tiny and statistically insignificant differences in the self-reported ideological extremeness 6 of respondents who rely on television, radio or the Internet for national or international news.
That said, a ttest on the extent to which respondents indicate they are worried that either they or a family member will be exposed to Swine Flu and .29 standard deviations for Internet and TV news consumers, respectively. The corresponding partisan gap for respondents who indicated that they rely primarily on newspapers or magazines (more traditional sources with less opportunity for ideologically-based selfselection) for their news was far smaller (.14, or .13 standard deviations) and statistically insignificant, again with strong ideologues excluded. 8 The results differ only modestly when ideologues are included in the ttests. Similar patterns emerge if I exclude respondents who indicated in a separate question that they had either "no confidence at all" (in one test) or "a lot 6 This is based on a question asking respondents about their political ideology, recoded to a 0-3 scale, where 0=moderate or "don't know", 1=liberal or conservative, and 2=very liberal or very conservative. 7 Response options were: 3=very worried, 2=somewhat worried, 1=not too worried, or 0=not at all worried. Those who indicated they were "exposed already" were excluded, while "don't know" responses were recoded to the center of the scale (1.5). percentage points more likely than their counterparts who did not to name Swine Flu and the vaccine issue as the story they had followed most closely the prior week (.30 vs. .20, p<.10 ).
Several of the other "new" media outlets -including CNN and radio news --were also associated with reduced attention to Swine Flu. Regular radio news consumers were about 7 percentage points less likely than non-radio-news-consumers to indicate that they had followed the Swine Flu/vaccine issue most closely, though this effect is not statistically significant. The corresponding drop in attention for regular CNN viewers is about 12 percentage points (.28 vs. .16, p<.10) . If I limit the sample to respondents who identified themselves as "very conservative," then regular Internet consumption is associated with a 7 percentage point, albeit statistically insignificant (p<.19) decline in the likelihood of having followed Swine Flu and its vaccine most closely of the issues in the news the prior week (.18 vs. .11).
The fact that other new media did not produce attention effects vis-à-vis Swine Flu and the vaccine comparable in magnitude or significance to that associated with Fox likely stems from several factors, including (a) Fox's status as a particular focal point for conservative
Republican news consumers, (b) in some instances, the specificity of Fox News relative to, say, "radio news" in the survey question, the latter of which presumably includes political talk radio, but also other less politically slanted fare, and, perhaps most important, (c) the fact that respondents were able to select as many of the outlets from the list as they liked. This means that some of the Fox consumers almost certainly also exposed themselves to other media, like national network news or local TV news, potentially offering somewhat different messages regarding the Swine Flu and the vaccine program.
In sharp contrast to the patterns for conservative Republicans, among self-described liberal Democrats no statistically significant differences between regular Fox viewers and nonviewers emerged for any of the news stories. The same pattern emerges among liberal Democrats across all the media outlets included in the survey, with the sole exception of local TV news.
Liberal Democrats who regularly watch local TV news were 18 percentage points more likely (.34 vs. .16, p<.05) than their counterparts who did not regularly watch to report following the Swine Flu/vaccine issue most closely. Presumably, the weaker relationships for liberal Democrats stem from the aforementioned higher ex ante levels of interest in the issue among Democrats and greater trust of the government officials and agencies talking about it. That said, when I limit the analysis to self-described "very liberal" respondents, the results strengthen considerably for national network news and MSNBC. In the former case, regular viewing of network news among very liberal respondents is associated with a 24 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having followed Swine Flu and its vaccine most closely during the prior These results clearly suggest that regularly consuming Fox News had quite different effects on the attention of conservative Republicans to Swine Flu and the vaccine than with respect to any of the other policy issues on the national agenda, substantially reducing their interest in the issue. Other new media mostly exhibited similar, albeit weaker effects. In contrast, network news consumption produced the opposite effect, at least among especially conservative respondents. Fewer significant relationships emerged among liberal Democrats, regardless of their sources of news, though several outlets typically preferred by liberals were associated with positive attention effects among "very liberal" respondents. 10 Taken together, these patterns appear largely to supports the Self-segregated Information Stream hypothesis.
Thus far, we have seen suggestive evidence that the trend toward increasing self-selection by Americans into politically "friendly" news environments, especially in the new media (cable, Internet, political talk radio, and especially Fox News) may help account for the partisan gap in concern over the Swine Flue and in self-reported intent to seek the Swine Flu vaccine. Of course, survey questions regarding interest or "intent" are not equivalent to actual behavior. Hence, in the next section I investigate state-level data on swine flu vaccination rates to see whether the sorts of patterns identified in the survey data reflect actual behavior. 10 While, in order to address the endogeneity concern raised earlier, I focused in this instance on "liberal Democrats" and "conservative Republicans," many of the patterns identified above, particularly with respect to Fox News, remain similar if I limit the analysis to liberals, conservatives, Democrats, or Republicans.
A Vaccination Gap?
To investigate actual patterns of vaccinations for Swine Flu, and determine whether there is evidence that political partisanship influences vaccination rates in part due to the different information streams to which partisans expose themselves, I turn to state-level CDC data on H1N1 immunizations and deaths from Swine Flu. The scale ranges from --.08 to .585, with larger numbers representing more rightward slant.
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I also collected a variety of state--level demographic and political data, which I employ as control variables in my analyses. 13 The survey analysis presented in the prior section suggests that Republicans are, all else equal, less concerned than Democrats about Swine Flu. The implication is that we would expect Republicans to be less likely to seek the H1N1 vaccine. should manifest itself in the form of higher per--capita infection rates and potentially also higher per--capita H1N1--related fatality levels in states with relatively higher proportions of registered Republicans--to--Democrats. Moreover, to the extent that differences in media coverage of the flu influenced consumers' levels of concern about it, and hence propensity to seek the vaccine, we would expect that, net of other likely causal factors, more right--leaning state media would be associated with lower per--capita H1N1 vaccine rates and perhaps also higher H1N1--related death rates. As preliminary tests of these predictions, I begin with some simple correlations and Turning to H1N1 vaccination rates for people over 6 months of age, these data indicate that in states with over a standard deviation above the mean pro--Republican tilts in party registration, residents were over 8% less likely to be vaccinated than their counterparts in states with over a standard deviation above the mean pro--Democratic party registration tilt (.247 vs. .329, p<.03 Controls include the unemployment rate, the percent of the population that is African American, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the per--capita number of swine flu cases in the state, as well as the ideological slant in rhetoric by the state's congressional delegation (as measured by Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) . Tables 1A and 1B present the results of 13 regressions. The first model excludes all but several basic controls (unemployment, race, number of H1N1 cases per capita, and the rhetorical slant of the state's congressional delegation). The second adds the partisan registration gap, and the third adds the voted for Obama dummy. The remaining models incrementally add a variety of socio--economic and demographic variables that could potentially account for variations in H1N1 vaccine rates. I include them incrementally due to the limited statistical leverage available in the data.
[ Tables A1 and 1B However, in the presence of a more direct control, it loses its predictive power. This suggests that in the case of the seasonal flu, while partisan differences in attitudes among
Democrats and Republicans do appear to matter -most likely owing to general differences in levels of trust in government programs and pronouncements ----these differences do not appear to directly stem from differences in Self--Segregated Information Streams via mass media.
Conclusion
I began this study by highlight a potentially important puzzle: Republicans appeared in surveys to express far lower levels of intent to seek Swine Flu vaccines than their Democratic counterparts. While there are almost certainly multiple explanations for this partisan gap, I argued that one part of the explanation concerned the evolution of mass media toward greater consumer capacity to self--select into ideologically "friendly" news
and information environments.
I tested several implications of what I termed the Self--Segregated Information
Stream Hypothesis against several data sets. I first found strong partisan gaps in concern over the flu that appeared highly correlated with news consumption preferences. Most notably, Republicans who rely on new media in general, and Fox News in particular, for news about Swine Flu are substantially less concerned about the flu, less attentive to it, and more skeptical of press coverage of the flu than their counterparts who rely on traditional news sources, or Democrats regardless of news sources. In the latter case, Democrats are most likely encountering similar information streams both in self--selected new media contexts, where they can seek out pro--Administration information streams, and in the traditional news media, where Indexing Theory (Bennett 1990, Baum and Groeling 2010) anticipates that the Administration's voice will tend to dominate news coverage in a crisis, especially in its early stages.
While these survey data cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality -that is, attitudes regarding the Swine Flu vaccine are "caused" by ideological preferences, which in turn "cause" media consumption choices ----several indirect tests suggested that this causal arrow is unlikely to fully account for the observed patterns (though it almost certainly contributes to them).
Finally, an investigation of real world, state--level, vaccine data reveals that these attitudes expressed in surveys appear to be reflected in actual patterns of Swine Flu vaccinations. Here, while I could not distinguish new vs. traditional media exposure, I was able to demonstrate that the overall tone of newspaper coverage in a state, on a left--to--right scale, strongly influences the percentage of the population seeking the H1N1 vaccine, even after accounting for a wide range of alternative potential explanations, ranging from a state's political orientation, to its demographics, to the socio--economic and ethnic profile of its population.
Because the evidence presented in this study is mostly suggestive, further research is necessary to more directly draw a linkage between Self--Segregated Information Streams and public health behavior in general, or Swine Flu vaccine rates, in particular. However, the evidence presented herein does strongly suggest that changes in the mass media environment hold potential profound implications for public health.
Current trends toward ever more consumer self--selection and increasingly sophisticated information filtering and media targeting of consumer preferences all appear to portend a trend toward greater audience fragmentation and hence continued shrinking of the Informational commons. For instance, it seems inevitable that news providers will increasingly apply the same filtering technologies that allow media content distributors like Netflix and iTunes to determine the types of movies or music a customer is likely to prefer, and suggest to them precisely that, to news and public affairs content. The end result may be what Cass Sunstein (2007) terms "cyberbalkanization," where the informational commons is largely supplanted by a "daily me" in which consumers encounter only the news and information they want, most of which tends to confirm rather than challenge their preexisting attitudes. Whether or not the informational commons disappears entirely, there is little question that technological innovations and shifts in audience behavior are changing the way citizens consume news, with content growing increasingly personalized and subject to individual preferences regarding what, when and where they entertain themselves or expose themselves to politically themed information.
Given the enormity and speed of the changes in this media marketplace, the potential consequences for democratic participation and the strategic landscape for politicians, the evolution of the communication environment within in which our politics are contested seems likely to play a central role in shaping the future course of American democracy. With respect to public health, to the extent that this Self--Segregated Information Stream process continues apace, the politicization of public health campaigns poses substantial risks to the efficacy of public health policy. It is therefore incumbent upon policymakers to strive to avoid such politicization to the greatest extent possible. Because many public health issues are not intrinsically partisan, it is easy to miss their potential for generating polarized attitudes and behaviors, a potential that politically oriented new media providers have strong commercial incentives to exploit. Failing to recognize the potential health consequences of polarized debates surrounding seemingly non--partisan issues like protecting against flu pandemics thus risks undermining their effectiveness. Kernell & Rice (2010) , Feltus (2009) 
